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Abstract
This work considers the multiple-access multicast error-correction scenario over a packetized network with
z malicious edge adversaries. The network has min-cut m and packets of length ℓ, and each sink demands all
information from the set of sources S. The capacity region is characterized for both a “side-channel” model (where
sources and sinks share some random bits that are secret from the adversary) and an “omniscient” adversarial
model (where no limitations on the adversary’s knowledge are assumed). In the “side-channel” adversarial model,
the use of a secret channel allows higher rates to be achieved compared to the “omniscient” adversarial model,
and a polynomial-complexity capacity-achieving code is provided. For the “omniscient” adversarial model, two
capacity-achieving constructions are given: the first is based on random subspace code design and has complexity
exponential in ℓm, while the second uses a novel multiple-field-extension technique and has O(ℓm|S|) complexity,
∗ In other words, MANIAC codes.
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2which is polynomial in the network size. Our code constructions are “end-to-end” in that all nodes except the
sources and sinks are oblivious to the adversaries and may simply implement predesigned linear network codes
(random or otherwise). Also, the sources act independently without knowledge of the data from other sources.
Index Terms
Double extended field, Gabidulin codes, network error-correction, random linear network coding, subspace
codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information dissemination can be optimized with the use of network coding. Network coding maximizes
the network throughput in multicast transmission scenarios [1]. For this scenario, it was shown in [2] that
linear network coding suffices to achieve the max-flow capacity from the source to each receiving node.
An algebraic framework for linear network coding was presented in [3]. Further, the linear combinations
employed at network nodes can be randomly selected in a distributed manner; if the coding field size is
sufficiently large the max-flow capacity is achieved with high probability [4].
However, network coding is vulnerable to malicious attacks from rogue users. Due to the mixing
operations at internal nodes, the presence of even a small number of adversarial nodes can contaminate
the majority of packets in a network, preventing sinks from decoding. In particular, an error on even a
single link might propagate to multiple downstream links via network coding, which might lead to the
extreme case in which all incoming links at the sink are in error. This is shown in Fig. 1, where the
action of a single malicious node contaminates all incoming links of the sink node due to packet mixing
at downstream nodes.
In such a case, network error-correction (introduced in [5]) rather than classical forward error-correction
(FEC) is required, since the former exploits the fact that the errors at the sinks are correlated, whereas
the latter assumes independent errors.
A number of papers e.g. [6], [7], [8] have characterized the set of achievable communication rates over
networks containing hidden malicious jamming and eavesdropping adversaries, and given corresponding
communication schemes. The latest code constructions (for instance [8] and [9]) have excellent parameters
– they have low computational complexity, are distributed, and are asymptotically rate-optimal. However,
in these papers the focus has been on single-source multicast problems, where a single source wishes to
communicate all its information to all sinks.
3Fig. 1. Propagation of network errors via network coding. The action of a single malicious node contaminates all incoming links of the
sink node due to packet mixing at downstream nodes.
In this work we examine the problem of multiple-access multicast, where multiple sources wish to
communicate all their information to all sinks. We characterize the optimal rate-region for several variants
of the multiple-access network error-correction problem and give matching code constructions, which have
low computational complexity when the number of sources is small.
We are unaware of any straightforward application of existing single-source network error-correcting
subspace codes that achieve the optimal rate regions. This is because single-source network error-correcting
codes such as those of [9] and [8] require the source to judiciously insert redundancy into the transmitted
codeword; however, in the distributed source case the codewords are constrained by the independence of
the sources.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
For a single-source single-sink network with min-cut C, the capacity of the network under arbitrary
errors on up to z links is given by
R ≤ C − 2z (1)
and can be achieved by a classical end-to-end error-correction code over multiple disjoint paths from source
to the sink. This result is a direct extension of the Singleton bound (see, e.g., [10]). Since the Singleton
bound can be achieved by a maximum distance separable code, as for example a Reed-Solomon code,
such a code also suffices to achieve the capacity in the single-source single-sink case.
In the network multicast scenario, the situation is more complicated. For the single-source multicast the
capacity region was shown ([5], [6], [7]) to be the same as (1), with C now representing the minimum
4of the min-cuts [6]. However, unlike single-source single-sink networks, in the case of single-source
multicast, network error correction is required: network coding is required in general for multicast even
in the error-free case [1], and with the use of network coding errors in the sink observations become
dependent and cannot be corrected by end-to-end codes.
Two flavors of the network error correction problem are often considered. In the coherent case, it is
assumed that there is centralized knowledge of the network topology and network code. Network error
correction for this case was first addressed by the work of Cai and Yeung [5], [6], [7] for the single
source scenario by generalizing classical coding theory to the network setting. However, their scheme has
decoding complexity which is exponential in the network size.
In the harder non-coherent case, the network topology and/or network code are not known a priori to
any of the honest parties. In this setting, [9], [11] provided network error-correcting codes with a design
and implementation complexity that is only polynomial in the size of network parameters. Reference [11]
introduced an elegant approach where information transmission occurs via the space spanned by the
received packets/vectors, hence any generating set for the same space is equivalent to the sink [11]. Error-
correction techniques for this case were proposed in [11] and [8] in the form of constant dimension and
rank metric codes, respectively, where the codewords are defined as subspaces of some ambient space.
These works considered only the single source case.
For the non-coherent multi-source multicast scenario without errors, the scheme of [4] achieves any
point inside the rate-region. An extension of subspace codes to multiple sources, for a non-coherent
multiple-access channel model without errors, was provided in [12], which gave practical achievable (but
not rate-optimal) algebraic code constructions, and in [13], which derived the capacity region and gave
a rate-optimal scheme for two sources. For the multi-source case with errors, [14] provided an efficient
code construction achieving a strict subregion of the capacity region.
III. CHALLENGES
In this work we address the capacity region and the corresponding code design for the multiple-source
multicast communication problem under different adversarial scenarios. The issues which arise in this
problem are best explained with a simple example for a single sink, which is shown in Fig. 2. Suppose
that the sources S1 and S2 encode their information independently from each other. We can allocate one
part of the network to carry only information from S1, and another part to carry only information from
S2. In this case only one source is able to communicate reliably under one link error. However, if coding
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Fig. 2. A simple example to show that in the multiple source case in-network coding is required to achieve the network error correction
capacity.
at the middle nodes N1 and N2 is employed, the two sources are able to share network capacity to send
redundant information, and each source is able to communicate reliably at capacity 1 under a single link
error. This shows that in contrast to the single source case, coding across multiple sources is required, so
that sources can simultaneously use shared network capacity to send redundant information, even for a
single sink.
In Section VII we show that for the example network in Fig. 2, the capacity region is given by
R1 ≤ mS1 − 2z
R2 ≤ mS2 − 2z (2)
R1 +R2 ≤ mS1,S2 − 2z,
where for i = 1, 2, rate Ri is the information rate of Si, min-cut mSi is the minimum cut capacity between
Si and sink T , min-cut mS1,S2 is the minimum cut capacity between S1, S2 and T and z is the known
upper bound on the number of link errors. Hence, similarly to single-source multicast, the capacity region
of a multi-source multicast network is described by the cut-set bounds. From that perspective, one may
draw a parallel with point-to-point error-correction. However, for multi-source multicast networks point-
to-point error-correcting codes do not suffice and a careful network code design is required. For instance,
the work of [14], which applies single-source network error-correcting codes for this problem, achieves
a rate-region that is strictly smaller than the capacity region (2) when mS1 +mS2 6= mS1,S2 [15].
IV. OUR RESULTS
In this paper we consider a “side-channel” model and an “omniscient” adversarial model. In the former,
the adversary does not have access to all the information available in the network, for example as in [9],
[16] where the sources share a secret with the sink(s) in advance of the network communication. Let S
6be the set of sources in the network, s be the number of sources, Ri be the multicast transmission rate
from source Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, to every sink, and for any non-empty subset S ′ ⊆ S let mS′ be the minimum
min-cut capacity between any sink and S ′.
In Section VI we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider a multiple-source multicast network error-correction problem on network G–possibly
with unknown topology–where each source shares a random secret with each of the sinks. For any errors
on up to z links, the capacity region is given by:
∑
i∈I(S′)
Ri ≤ mS′ − z ∀S
′ ⊆ S. (3)
and every point in the rate region can be achieved with a polynomial-time code.
By capacity region we mean the closure of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rs) for which there is a sequence of
codes of length ℓ, message sets J iℓ = {1, . . . , J iℓ} and encoding and decoding functions {f iℓ}, {φ
j
ℓ} for
every node i in the network and every sink j, so that for every ǫ > 0 and δ > 0 there is integer L(ǫ, δ) > 0
such that for every ℓ > L(ǫ, δ) we have 1
ℓ
log |J i| ≥ Ri − ǫ and the probability of decoding error at any
sink is less than δ regardless of the message.
In “omniscient” adversarial model, we do not assume any limitation on the adversary’s knowledge,
i.e. decoding should succeed for arbitrary error values. In Section VII-A we derive the multiple-access
network error-correction capacity for both the coherent and non-coherent case. We show that network
error-correction coding allows redundant network capacity to be shared among multiple sources, enabling
the sources to simultaneously communicate reliably at their individual cut-set capacities under adversarial
errors. Specifically, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Consider a multiple-source multicast network error-correction problem on network G whose
topology may be unknown. For any errors on up to z links, the capacity region is given by:
∑
i∈I(S′)
Ri ≤ mS′ − 2z ∀S
′ ⊆ S. (4)
The rate-regions are, perhaps not surprisingly, larger for the side-channel model than for the omniscient
adversarial model.
Finally, in Section VII-B we provide computationally efficient distributed schemes for the non-coherent
case (and therefore for the coherent case too) that are rate-optimal for correction of network errors injected
7by computationally unbounded adversaries. In particular, our code construction achieves decoding success
probability at least 1− |s||E|/p where p is the size of the finite field Fp over which coding is performed,
with complexity O(ℓm|S|), which is polynomial in the network size.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section V we formally introduce our problem
and give some mathematical preliminaries. In Section VI we derive the capacity region and construct
multi-source multicast error-correcting codes for the side-channel model. In Section VII, we consider
two network error-correction schemes for omniscient adversary models which are able to achieve the
full capacity region in both the coherent and non-coherent case. In particular, we provide a general
approach based on minimum distance decoding, and then refine it to a practical code construction and
decoding algorithm which has polynomial complexity (in all parameters except the number of sources).
Furthermore, our codes are fully distributed in the sense that different sources require no knowledge of
the data transmitted by their peers, and end-to-end, i.e. all nodes are oblivious to the adversaries present
in the network and simply implement random linear network coding [17]. A remaining bottleneck is that
while the implementation complexity (in terms of packet-length, field-size, and computational complexity)
of our codes is polynomial in the size of most network parameters, it increases exponentially with the
number of sources. Thus, the design of efficient schemes for a large number of sources is still open.
Portions of this work were presented in [18] and in [19].
V. PRELIMINARIES
A. Model
We consider a delay-free acyclic network G = (V, E) where V is the set of nodes and E is the set
of edges. The capacity of each edge is normalized to be one symbol of the finite field Fp per unit time
where p is a power of a prime. Edges with non-unit capacity are modeled as parallel edges.
There are two subsets S, T ⊆ V of nodes where S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Ss} is a set of s sources and T is
a set of sinks within the network. Let Ri be the multicast transmission rate from Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, to every
sink. For any non-empty subset S ′ ⊆ S, let I(S ′) ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , s} be the indices of the source nodes that
belong to S ′. Let mS′ be the minimum min-cut capacity between S ′ and any sink. For each i, let Ci be
the code used by source i. Let CS′ be the Cartesian product of the individual codes of the sources in S ′.
Within the network there is a computationally unbounded adversary who can observe all the transmis-
8sions and inject its own packets on up to z links1 that may be chosen as a function of his knowledge of
the network, the message, and the communication scheme. The location of the z adversarial links is fixed
but unknown to the communicating parties. In case of a side-channel model, there additionally exists a
random secret shared between all sources and each of the sinks as in [9], [16].
The sources on the other hand do not have any knowledge about each other’s transmitted information
or about the links compromised by the adversary. Their goal is to judiciously add redundancy into their
transmitted packets so that they can achieve any rate-tuple within the capacity region.
B. Random Linear Network Coding
In this paper, we consider the following well-known distributed random linear coding scheme [17].
Sources: All sources have incompressible data which they wish to deliver to all the destinations over
the network. Source Si arranges its data into batches of bi packets and insert these packets into a bi × ℓ
message matrix Mi over Fp (the packet-length ℓ is a network design parameter). Each source Si then
takes independent and uniformly random linear combinations over Fp of the rows of Mi to generate the
packets transmitted on each outgoing edge.
Network nodes: Each internal node similarly takes (uniformly) random linear combinations of the
packets on its incoming edges to generate packets transmitted on its outgoing edges.
Adversary: The adversarial packets are defined as the difference between the received and transmitted
packets on each link. They are similarly arranged into a matrix Z of size z × ℓ.
Sink: Each sink t ∈ T constructs a B × ℓ matrix Y over Fp by treating the received packets as
consecutive length-ℓ row vectors of Y . Since all the operations in the network are linear, each sink has
an incoming matrix Y that is given by
Y = T1M1 + T2M2 + . . .+ TsMs + TzZ, (5)
where Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, is the overall transform matrix from Si to t ∈ T and Tz is the overall transform
matrix from the adversary to sink t ∈ T .
C. Finite Field Extensions
In the analysis below denote by Fpm×n the set of all m×n matrices with elements from Fp. The identity
matrix with dimension m×m is denoted by Im, and the zero matrix of any dimension is denoted by O.
1Note that since each transmitted symbol in the network is from a finite field, modifying symbol x to symbol y is equivalent to
injecting/adding symbol y − x into x.
9The dimension of the zero matrix will be clear from the context stated. For clarity of notation, vectors
are in bold-face (e.g. A).
Every finite field Fp, where p can be algebraically extended2 [20] to a larger finite field Fq, where
q = pn for any positive integer n. Note that Fq includes Fp as a subfield; thus any matrix A ∈ Fpm×ℓ is
also a matrix in Fqm×ℓ. Hence throughout the paper, multiplication of matrices from different fields (one
from the base field and the other from the extended field) is allowed and is computed over the extended
field.
The above extension operation defines a bijective mapping between Fpm×n and Fqm as follows:
• For each A ∈ Fpm×n, the folded version of A is a vector Af in Fqm given by AaT where a =
{a1, . . . , an} is a basis of the extension field Fq with respect to Fp. Here we treat the ith row of A
as a single element in Fq to obtain the ith element of Af .
• For each B ∈ Fqm, the unfolded version of B is a matrix Bu ∈ Fpm×n. Here we treat the ith element
of B as a row in Fp1×n to obtain the ith row of Bu.
We can also extend these operations to include more general scenarios. Specifically any matrix A ∈
Fp
m×ℓn can be written as a concatenation of matrices A = [A1 . . . Aℓ], where Ai ∈ Fpm×n. The folding
operation is defined as follows: Af = [Af1 . . .A
f
ℓ ]. Similarly the unfolding operation u can be applied to
a number of submatrices of a large matrix, e.g., [Af1 . . .A
f
ℓ ]
u = [(Af1)
u . . . (Afℓ )
u] = [A1 . . . Aℓ].
In this paper double algebraic extensions are also considered. More precisely let FQ be an algebraic
extension from Fq, where Q = qN = pnN for any positive integer N . Table I summarizes the notation of
the fields considered.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF FIELD NOTATIONS
Field Fp Fq FQ
Size p q = pn Q = qN
Note: Of the three fields Fp, Fq and FQ defined above, two or sometimes all three appear simultaneously
in the same equation. To avoid confusion, unless otherwise specified, the superscript f for folding is from
Fp to Fq, and the superscript u for unfolding is from Fq (or FQ) to Fp.
2Let Fp[x] be the set of all polynomials over Fp and f(x) ∈ Fp[x] be an irreducible polynomial of degree n. Then Fp[x]/f(x) defines
an algebraic extension field Fpn by a homomorphic mapping [20].
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D. Subspace codes
In [11] an algebraic framework was developed for the non-coherent network scenario in the single-
source case. The idea behind it is to treat the fixed-length packets as the vector subspaces spanned by
them. Then what really matters at the decoder is the subspace spanned by the received packets rather than
the individual packets.
Let V be the vector space of length-ℓ vectors over the finite field Fp, representing the set of all possible
values of packets transmitted and received in the network. Let P(V ) denote the set of all subspaces of V .
A code C consists of a nonempty subset of P(V ), where each codeword U ∈ C is a subspace of constant
dimension.
Subspace errors are defined as additions of vectors to the transmitted subspace and subspace erasures
are defined as deletions of vectors from the transmitted subspace. Note that depending on the network
code rate and network topology, network errors and erasures translate differently to subspace errors and
erasures. For instance, subject to the position of adversary in the network, one network error can result in
both dimension addition and deletion (i.e., both subspace error and subspace erasure in our terminology).
Let ρ be the number of subspace erasures and let t be the number of subspace errors caused by z network
errors.
The subspace metric [11] between two vector spaces U1, U2 ∈ P(V ) is defined as
dS(U1, U2)
.
= dim(U1 + U2)− dim(U1 ∩ U2)
= dim(U1) + dim(U2)− 2 dim(U1 ∩ U2).
In [11] it shown that the minimum subspace distance decoder can successfully recover the transmitted
subspace from the received subspace if
2(ρ+ t) < DminS ,
where DminS is the minimum subspace distance of the code. Note that dS treats insertions and deletions
of subspaces symmetrically. In [21] the converse of this statement for the case when information is
transmitted at the maximum rate was shown.
In [22] a different metric on V , namely, the injection metric, was introduced and shown to improve
upon the subspace distance metric for decoding of non-constant-dimension codes. The injection metric
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between two vector spaces U1, U2 ∈ P(V ) is defined as
dI(U1, U2)
.
= max(dim(U1), dim(U2))− dim(U1 ∩ U2)
= dim(U1 + U2)−min(dim(U1), dim(U2)).
dI can be interpreted as the number of error packets that an adversary needs to inject in order to transform
input space U1 into an output space U2. The minimum injection distance decoder is designed to decode
the received subspace as with as few error injections as possible. Note that for constant-dimensional codes
dS and dI are related by
dI(U1, U2) =
1
2
dS(U1, U2).
E. Gabidulin Codes and Rank Metric Codes
Gabidulin in [23] introduced a class of error correcting codes over Fpm×n. Let X ∈ FRq be the information
vector, G ∈ Fm×Rq be the generator matrix, (GX)u ∈ Fm×np be the transmitted matrix, Z ∈ Fm×np be the
error matrix, and (GX)u + Z ∈ Fm×np be the received matrix. Then decoding is possible if and only if
rank(Z) ≤ ⌊d
2
⌋, where d = m−R + 1 is the minimum distance of the code.
The work of [8] utilizes the results of [23] to obtain network error-correcting codes with the following
properties:
Theorem 3 (Theorem 11 in [8]). Let Z be expressed as Z =∑i∈[1,τ ] LiEi, such that:
• For each i ∈ [1, τ ], Li ∈ Fpm×1 and Ei ∈ Fp1×n;
• For each i ∈ [1, µ], Li is known a priori by the sink;
• For each i ∈ [µ+ 1, µ+ δ], Ei is known a priori by the sink;
• 2τ − µ− δ ≤ d− 1,
using Gabidulin codes the sink can decode X with at most O(mn) operations over Fq.
When µ = δ = 0, Theorem 3 reduces to the basic case where the sink has no prior knowledge about
Z.
For any matrices B1 ∈ Fpm1×m and B2 ∈ Fpm2×m the following proposition holds and is a direct
consequence of Corollary 3 in [8]:
Proposition 1. dS(〈B1〉, 〈B2〉) ≤ 2rank(B1 − B2)
where 〈B1〉, 〈B2〉 are the row-spaces of matrices B1, B2 respectively.
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VI. SIDE-CHANNEL MODEL
The side-channel model is an extension of the random secret model considered in [16] to the case of
multiple sources. In that model every source shares a uniformly distributed random secret with each of
the sinks. For each source the “secret” consists of a set of symbols drawn uniformly at random from
the base field Fp and the adversary does not have access to these secret symbols. This set of uniformly
random symbols can be shared between each source and the sinks either before the transmission starts
or during the transmission through a low capacity channel that is secret from the adversary and cannot
be attacked by it. Each source has a different secret from all the other sources which makes this scheme
distributed.
Proof of Theorem 1: Converse: Let li,j, j = 1, . . . , ni, be the outgoing links of each source Si, i =
1, . . . , s. Take any S ′ ⊆ S. We construct the graph GS′ from G by adding a virtual super source node
wS′ , and ni links l′i,j, j = 1, . . . , ni, from wS′ to source Si for each i ∈ I(S ′). Note that the minimum cut
capacity between wS′ and any sink is at least mS′ . Any network code that multicasts rate Ri from each
source Si, i ∈ I(S
′) over G corresponds to a network code that multicasts rate
∑
i∈I(S′)
Ri from wS′ to all
sinks over GS′; the symbol on each link l′i,j is the same as that on link li,j , and the coding operations at
all other nodes are identical for G and GS′ . For the case of a single source, the adversary can choose the
z links on the min-cut and set their outputs equal to zero. Therefore in this case the maximum possible
achievable rate R is
R ≤ C − z (6)
where C is the multicast min-cut capacity of the network. The converse follows from applying inequality
(6) to wS′ for each S ′ ⊆ S.
Achievability: In the case of the side-channel model, for notational convenience, we will restrict
ourselves to the analysis of the situation where there are only two sources S1,S2 ∈ V transmitting
information to one sink t ∈ V , since the extension of our result to more sources and sinks is straightforward
and analyzed briefly in Section VIII.
Encoding: Source S1 encodes its data into matrix X1 ∈ FpR1×(ℓ−α) of size R1 × (ℓ − α), where α =
m2S1,S2 + 1, with symbols from Fp and arranges its message into M1 =
[
L1 X1
]
where L1 ∈ FpR1×α is
a matrix that will be defined below. Similarly, source S2 arranges its data into matrix M2 =
[
L2 X2
]
where L2 ∈ FpR2×α will be defined below and X2 ∈ FpR2×(ℓ−α).
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The shared secret between source Si and sink t is composed of a length–α vector Wi =[
wi1 . . . wiα
]
∈ Fp
1×α and a matrix Hi ∈ FpRi×α, where the elements of both Wi and Hi are drawn
uniformly at random from Fp. The vector Wi defines a parity-check matrix Pi ∈ Fpℓ×α whose (m,n)-th
entry equals (win)m, i.e., the element win taken to the mth power. The matrix Li is defined so that the
following equality holds
Hi = MiPi =
[
Li Xi
]


Vi
−−
P˜i

 = LiVi +XiP˜i (7)
where Vi, P˜i correspond to rows {1, . . . , α} and {α + 1, . . . , ℓ} of matrix Pi respectively. Matrix Vi ∈
Fp
α×α is a Vandermonde matrix and is invertible whenever vector Wi contains pairwise different non-zero
elements from Fp, else Wi is non-invertible which happens with probability at most α2/p (each of the
elements wij is zero or identical to another element with probability at most α/p). Whenever the matrix
Vi is invertible source Si solves equation (7) to find Li and substitutes it into matrix Mi. When the matrix
Vi is non-invertible then Li is substituted with the zero matrix.
Linear Coding: Once matrices M1, M2 are formed then both sources and the internal nodes perform
random linear network coding operations and therefore sink t gets
Y = T1M1 + T2M2 + TzZ
⇔Y =
[
T1 T2 Tz
]


M1
−−
M2
−−
Z


(8)
where Ti ∈ FpmS1,S2×Ri and Tz ∈ FpmS1,S2×z.
Decoding: Assume that matrix Y ∈ FpmS1,S2×ℓ has column rank equal to r and matrix Y s ∈ FpmS1,S2×r
contains r linearly independent columns of Y . Since all the columns of Y can be written as linear
combinations of columns of Y s, then Y = Y sF where F ∈ Fpr×ℓ. The columns of M1, M2 and Z
corresponding to those in Y s are denoted as Ms1 ∈ FpR1×r, Ms2 ∈ FpR2×r and Zs ∈ Fpz×r respectively.
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Therefore
Y s =
[
T1 T2 Tz
]


Ms1
−−
Ms2
−−
Zs


(9)
and by using equations (8), (9) we have
Y = Y sF
(8)
⇒
(9)
[
T1 T2 Tz
]


M1
−−
M2
−−
Z


=
[
T1 T2 Tz
]


Ms1
−−
Ms2
−−
Zs


F.
Therefore M1 = Ms1F and M2 = Ms2F since for large enough p, matrix
[
T1 T2 Tz
]
is invertible with
high probability [9]. Consequently, equation (7) can be written as Ms1 (FP1) = H1 where matrices F , P1
and H1 are known and matrix Ms1 is unknown and can be found using standard Gaussian elimination.
As in [9] it can be proved that the solution obtained by the Gaussian elimination is with high probability
the unique solution to equation M1P1 = H1. Indeed, using Claim 5 of [9], for any Mˆs1 6= Ms1 the probability
(over w11, . . . , w1α) that Mˆs1 (FP1) = H1 is at most
(
ℓ
p
)α
. Since there are pR1·r different matrices Mˆ1
(Mˆ1 = Mˆ
s
1F and Mˆs1 ∈ FpR1×r) by taking the union bound over all different Mˆ1 (Corollary 6 in [9])
we conclude that the probability of having more than one solution for equation M1P1 = H1 is at most
pR1·mS1,S2
(
ℓ
p
)α
< ℓ
α
p
. Decoding of X2 is similar.
Probability of error analysis: In order for the decoding to fail one or more of the following three events
should occur:
1) At least one of the network transform matrices
[
T1 T2 Tz
]
is not full column rank. According
to [17], this happens with probability less than

 |E|
z

 |E||T |
p
, where |E|, |T | is the number of edges
and the number of sinks in the network. Term


|E|
z

 is the number of different sets of z links the
adversary can attack and |E|
p
is an upper bound for the probability that matrix
[
T1 T2 Tz
]
is not
full column rank when the adversary has attacked a specific set of links.
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2) Either of the Vandermonde matrices V1 or V2 are not invertible. By using the union bound this
happens with probability at most 2α2/p.
3) There are more than one solutions for equations Mˆsi (FPi) = Hi for i ∈ {1, 2}. This happens with
probability at most 2ℓα/p = 2ℓ(m
2
S1,S2
+1)/p.
3Hence, it is not difficult to see that the probability of decoding failure can be made arbitrarily small as
the size p of the finite field increases. Moreover increasing ℓ without bound we can approach any point
inside the rate-region. The decoding complexity of the algorithm is dominated by the complexity of the
Gaussian elimination that is O(ℓm3S1,S2).
VII. OMNISCIENT ADVERSARIAL MODEL
A. General approach
In this section we construct capacity-achieving codes for the multiple-source multicast non-coherent
network scenario. We use the algebraic framework of subspace codes developed in [11], which provides
a useful tool for network error and erasure correction over general unknown networks. In Section V-D,
we gave basic concepts and definitions of subspace network codes needed for further discussion.
In the proof of Theorem 2 we show how to design non-coherent network codes that achieve upper
bounds given by (4) when a minimum (or bounded) injection distance decoder is used at the sink nodes.
Our code construction uses random linear network coding at intermediate nodes, single-source network
error-correction capacity-achieving codes at each source, and an overall global coding vector. Our choice
of decoder relies on the observation that subspace erasures are not arbitrarily chosen by the adversary,
but also depend on the network code. Since, as we show below, with high probability in a random linear
network code, subspace erasures do not cause confusion between transmitted codewords, the decoder
focuses on the discrepancy between the sent and the received codewords caused by subspace errors.
The error analysis shows that injection distance decoding succeeds with high probability over the random
network code. On the other hand, the subspace minimum distance of the code is insufficient to account for
the total number of subspace errors and erasures that can occur. This is in contrast to constant dimension
single-source codes, where subspace distance decoding is equivalent to injection distance decoding [22].
Proof of Theorem 2: Converse: The proof is similar to the converse of the proof of Theorem 1 with
the exception that after connecting any subset of sources S ′ ⊆ S by a virtual super-source node wS′ , we
apply the network Singleton bound [6] to wS′ for each S ′ ⊆ S.
3From the three probability events the third one dominates the other two when packet size is large.
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Achievability: 1) Code construction: Consider any rate vector (R1, . . . , Rs) such that
∑
i∈I(S′)
Ri < mS′ − 2z ∀S
′ ⊆ S. (10)
Let each Ci, i = 1, . . . , s be a code consisting of codewords that are ki−dimensional linear subspaces. The
codeword transmitted by source Si is spanned by the packets transmitted by Si. From the single source
case, for each source i = 1, . . . , s we can construct a code Ci where
ki > Ri + z (11)
that corrects any z additions [9]. This implies that by [21], Ci has minimum subspace distance greater
than 2z, i.e. for any pair of distinct codewords Vi, V ′i ∈ Ci
dS(Vi, V
′
i ) = dim(Vi) + dim(V
′
i )− 2 dim(Vi ∩ V
′
i ) > 2z.
Hence,
dim(Vi ∩ V
′
i ) < ki − z ∀ Vi, V
′
i ∈ Ci. (12)
By (11), we have:
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki >
∑
i∈I(S′)
Ri + |S
′|z.
Therefore, by combining it with (10) and scaling all source rates and link capacities by a sufficiently large
integer if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that we can choose ki satisfying
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki ≤ mS′ + (|S
′| − 2)z ∀S ′ ⊆ S. (13)
We can make vectors from one source linearly independent of vectors from all other sources by
prepending a length–(
∑
i∈I(S)
ki) global encoding vector, where the jth global encoding vector, j =
1, 2, . . . ,
∑
i∈I(S) ki, is the unit vector with a single nonzero entry in the jth position. This adds an
overhead that becomes asymptotically negligible as packet length grows. This ensures that
dim(Vi ∩ Vj) = 0 ∀i 6= j, Vi ∈ Ci, Vj ∈ Cj . (14)
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Error analysis: Let X ∈ CS be the sent codeword, and let R be the subspace received at a sink. Consider
any S ′ ⊆ S. Let S ′ = S\S ′. Let X = V ⊕W , where V ∈ CS′ ,W ∈ CS′ and V is spanned by the codeword
Vi from each code Ci, i ∈ I(S ′). We will show that with high probability over the random network code,
there does not exist another codeword Y = V ′ ⊕W , such that V ′ is spanned by a codeword V ′i 6= Vi
from each code Ci, i ∈ I(S ′), which could also have produced R under arbitrary errors on up to z links
in the network.
Fix any sink t. Let R be the set of packets (vectors) received by t, i.e. R is the subspace spanned by
R. Each of the packets in R is a linear combination of vectors from V and W and error vectors, and can
be expressed as p = up +wp, where wp is in W and the global encoding vector of up has zero entries
in the positions corresponding to sources in set I(S ′).
The key idea behind our error analysis is to show that with high probability subspace deletions do not
cause confusion, and that more than z additions are needed for X be decoded wrongly at the sink, i.e we
will show that
dI(R, V
′ ⊕W ) = dim(R)− dim(R ∩ (V ′ ⊕W )) > z.
Let P = span{up : p ∈ R}. Let M be the matrix whose rows are the vectors p ∈ R, where the jth
row of M corresponds to the jth vector p ∈ R. Similarly, let Mu be the matrix whose jth row is the
vector up corresponding to the jth vector p ∈ R, and let Mw be the matrix whose jth row is the vector
wp corresponding to the jth vector p ∈ R. Consider matrices A,B such that the rows of AMu form a
basis for P ∩ V ′ and, together with the rows of BMu, form a basis for P . The linear independence of
the rows of

 AMu
BMu

 implies that the rows of

 AM
BM

 are also linearly independent, since otherwise
there would be a nonzero matrix D such that
D

 AM
BM

 = 0⇒ D

 AMw
BMw

 = 0
⇒ D

 AMu
BMu

 = 0,
a contradiction. For wp in W , up + wp is in V ′ ⊕W only if up is in V ′, because the former implies
up = up +wp −wp is in V ′ ⊕W and since up has zero entries in the positions of the global encoding
vector corresponding to I(S ′) it must be in V ′. Thus, since any vector in the row space of BMu is not in
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V ′, any vector in the row space of BM is not in V ′ ⊕W . Since the row space of BM is a subspace of
R, it follows that the number of rows of B is equal to dim(P )− dim(P ∩ V ′) and is less than or equal
to dim(R)− dim(R ∩ (V ′ ⊕W )). Therefore,
dI(R, V
′ ⊕W ) = dim(R)− dim(R ∩ (V ′ ⊕W )) (15)
≥ dim(P )− dim(P ∩ V ′).
We next show that for random linear coding in a sufficiently large field, with high probability
dim(P )− dim(P ∩ V ′) > z (16)
for all V ′ spanned by a codeword V ′i 6= Vi from each code Ci, i ∈ I(S ′).
Consider first the network with each source i in S ′ transmitting ki linearly independent packets from
Vi, sources in S ′ silent, and no errors. From the maxflow-mincut bound, any rate vector (h1, . . . , h|S′|),
such that
∑
i∈S′′
hi ≤ mS′′ ∀S
′′ ⊆ S ′
can be achieved. Combining this with (13), we can see that in the error-free case, each si ∈ S ′ can
transmit information to the sink at rate ki − (|S
′|−2)z
|S′|
for a total rate of
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki − (|S
′| − 2)z. (17)
With sources in S ′ still silent, consider the addition of z unit-rate sources corresponding to the error links.
The space spanned by the received packets corresponds to P . Consider any V ′ spanned by a codeword
V ′i 6= Vi from each code Ci, i ∈ I(S ′).
Let Z be the space spanned by the error packets, and let z′ ≤ z be the minimum cut between the error
sources and the sink. Let P = PV ⊕ PZ , where PZ = P ∩ Z and PV is a subspace of V . There exists a
routing solution, which we distinguish by adding tildes in our notation, such that dim P˜Z = z′ and, from
(17), dim P˜ ≥
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki − (|S
′| − 2)z, so
dim(P˜V ) ≥
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki − (|S
′| − 2)z − z′. (18)
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Note that, by (14), a packet from Vi is not in any V ′j ∈ Cj , j 6= i, and hence is in V ′ if and only if it is
in V ′i . Therefore, by (12)
dim(P˜V ∩ V
′) ≤
∑
i∈I(S′)
dim(Vi ∩ V
′
i ) <
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki − |S
′|z.
Therefore, using (18) we have
dim(P˜V ∪ V
′) = dim(P˜V ) + dim(V
′)− dim(P˜V ∩ V
′)
> dim(P˜V ) + dim(V
′) + |S ′|z −
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki
≥
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki − (|S
′| − 2)z − z′ + |S ′|z
=
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki + 2z − z
′ ≥
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki + z.
Then
dim(P˜ ∪ V ′) >
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki + z.
For random linear coding in a sufficiently large field, with high probability by its generic nature
dim(P ∪ V ′) ≥ dim(P˜ ∪ V ′) >
∑
i∈I(S′)
ki + z,
and this also holds for any z or fewer errors, all sinks, and all V ′ spanned by a codeword V ′i 6= Vi from
each code Ci, i ∈ I(S ′). Then, (16) follows by
dim(P )− dim(P ∩ V ′) = dim(P ∪ V ′)− dim(V ′).
Hence, using (16) and (15),
dI(R, V
′ ⊕W ) = dim(R)− dim(R ∩ (V ′ ⊕W ))
≥ dim(P )− dim(P ∩ V ′) > z.
Thus, more than z additions are needed to produce R from Y = V ′⊕W . By the generic nature of random
linear coding, with high probability this holds for any S ′. Therefore, at every sink the minimum injection
distance decoding succeeds with high probability over the random network code.
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Decoding complexity: Take any achievable rate vector (R1, R2, . . . , Rs). For each i = 1, . . . , s, Si can
transmit at most pRiℓ independent symbols. Decoding can be done by exhaustive search, where the decoder
checks each possible set of codewords to find the one with minimum distance from the observed set of
packets, therefore, the decoding complexity of the minimum injection distance decoder is upper bounded
by O(pl
∑s
i=1Ri).
B. Polynomial-time construction
Similar to the side-channel model, we will describe the code for the case where there are only two
sources S1,S2 ∈ V transmitting information to one sink t ∈ V , since the extension of our results to
more sources and sinks is straightforward and analyzed briefly in Section VIII. To further simplify the
discussion we show the code construction for rate-tuple (R1, R2) satisfying R1 ≤ mS1−2z, R2 ≤ mS2−2z,
R1 + R2 + 2z = mS1,S2 and exactly mS1,S2 edges incident to sink t (if more do, redundant information
can be discarded).
Encoding: Each source Si, i ∈ {1, 2}, organizes its information into a matrix Xi ∈ FpRi×knN with elements
from Fp, where n = R1 + 2z, N = R2 + 2z and k is an integer (and a network parameter). In order to
correct adversarial errors, redundancy is introduced through the use of Gabidulin codes (see Section V-E
for details).
More precisely the information of S1 can be viewed as a matrix X1 ∈ FqR1×kN , where Fq is an algebraic
extension of Fp and q = pn (see Section V-C for details). Before transmission X1 is multiplied with a
generator matrix, G1 ∈ Fqn×R1 , creating G1X1 ∈ Fqn×kN whose unfolded version M ′1 = (G1X1)u is a
matrix in Fpn×knN . The information of S2 can be viewed as a matrix X2 ∈ FR2×kQ , where FQ is an algebraic
extension of Fq where Q = qN = pnN . Before transmission X2 is multiplied with a generator matrix,
G2 ∈ F
N×R2
Q , creating G2X2 ∈ FN×kQ whose unfolded version M ′2 = (G2X2)u over Fp is a matrix in
Fp
N×knN
. Both G1 and G2 are chosen as generator matrices for Gabidulin codes and have the capability
of correcting errors of rank at most z over Fp and Fq respectively.
In the scenario where sink t does not know T1 and T2 a priori the two sources append headers on
their transmitted packets to convey information about T1 and T2 to the sink. Thus source S1 constructs
message matrix M1 =
[
In O M
′
1
]
with the zero matrix O having dimensions n × N , and source S2
constructs a message matrix
[
O IN M
′
2
]
with the zero matrix O having dimension N × n. Each row
of matrices M1, M2 is a packet of length ℓ = knN + n+N .
Before we continue with the decoding we need to prove the following two Lemmas:
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Lemma 1. Folding a matrix does not increase its rank.
Proof: Let matrix H ∈ Fpm×kn has rank(H) = r in field Fp. Thus H = WZ, where Z ∈ Fpr×kn is of
full row rank and W ∈ Fpm×r is of full column rank. After the folding operation H becomes Hf = WZf
and therefore has rank in the extension field Fq, where q = pn, is at most r, i.e. rank(Hf) ≤ r.
Lemma 2. Matrix
[
T1G1 T2
]
∈ Fq
mS1,S2×mS1,S2 is invertible with probability at least 1− |E|/p.
Proof: Let X be the set of random variables over Fp comprised of the local coding coefficients used
in the random linear network code. Thus the determinant of
[
T1G1 T2
]
is a polynomial f(X ) over Fq
of degree at most |E| (see Theorem 1 in [17] for details). Since the variables X in f(X ) are evaluated
over Fp, f(X ) is equivalent to a vector of polynomials (f1(X ), f2(X ), . . . , fn(X )), where fi(X ) ∈ Fp[X ]
is a polynomial over Fp with variables in X . Note that fi(X ) also has degree no more than |E| for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus once we prove that there exists an evaluation of X such that f is a nonzero vector
over Fp, we can show that matrix
[
T1G1 T2
]
is invertible with probability at least 1 − |E|/p by the
Schwartz-Zippel lemma [24] (Proposition 98).
Since R1 + N = mS1,S2 , R1 ≤ mS1 and N ≤ mS2 , there exist R1 + N edge-disjoint-
paths:P11 ,P12 , . . . ,P1R1 from S1 to t and P
2
1 ,P
2
2 , . . . ,P
2
N from S2 to t. The variables in X are evaluated
in the following manner:
1) Let O be the zero matrix in Fqn×N . We choose the variables in X so that the R1 independent rows
of
[
G1 O
]
∈ Fq
n×mS1,S2 correspond to routing information from S1 to t via P11 , . . . ,P1R1 .
2) Let {uR1+1, uR1+2, . . . , umS1,S2} be N distinct rows of the identity matrix in FqmS1,S2×mS1,S2 such
that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, uR1+i has the element 1 located at position R1 + i. Then these N
vectors correspond to routing information from S2 to sink t via P21 ,P22 , . . . ,P2N .
Under such evaluations of the variables in X , matrix
[
T1G1 T2
]
equals

G
′
1 O
O IN

, where G′1 ∈
Fq
R1×R1 consists of the R1 independent rows of G1. Hence f is non-zero. Using the Schwartz-Zippel
Lemma f 6= 0 and thus
[
T1G1 T2
]
is invertible with probability at least 1 − |E|/p over the choices of
X .
Decoding: The two message matrices M1, M2 along with the packets inserted by the adversary are
transmitted to sink t through the network with the use of random linear network coding (see Section V-B)
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and therefore sink t gets:
Y = T1M1 + T2M2 + TzZ
⇔ Y =
[
Y1 Y2 Y3
]
=
[
T1 T2 A
]
+ E, (19)
where A = T1M ′1 + T2M ′2 ∈ FpmS1,S2×knN and E ∈ FpmS1,S2×ℓ has rank no more than z over field Fp. Let
E =
[
E1 E2 E3
]
, where E1 ∈ FpmS1,S2×n, E2 ∈ FpmS1,S2×N and E3 ∈ FpmS1,S2×knN . Sink t will first
decode M2 and then M1.
Stage 1: Decoding X2: Let Ya =
[
Y1G1 Y2 Y
f
3
]
be a matrix in FqmS1,S2×(R1+N+kN). To be precise:
Ya =
[
T1G1 T2 A
f
]
+
[
E1G1 E2 E
f
3
]
. (20)
Sink t uses invertible row operations over Fq to transform Ya into a row-reduced echelon matrix[
TRRE MRRE
]
that has the same row space as Ya, where TRRE has mS1,S2 = R1 + N columns and
MRRE has kN columns. Then the following propositions are from the results4 proved in [8]:
Proposition 2. 1) The matrix
[
TRRE MRRE
]
takes the form
[
TRRE MRRE
]
=

IC + LˆU
T
µ r
O Eˆ

,
where Uµ ∈ FqC×µ comprises of µ distinct columns of the C ×C identity matrix such that UTµ r = 0
and UTµ Lˆ = −Iµ. In particular, Lˆ in FqC×µ is the “error-location matrix”, r ∈ FqC×kN is the
“message matrix”, and Eˆ ∈ Fqδ×kN is the “known error value” (and its rank is denoted δ).
2) Let X =

X1
Mf2

 and e = r − X and τ = rank

Lˆ e
0 Eˆ


. Then 2τ − µ − δ is no more than
dS(
〈[
TRRE MRRE
]〉
,
〈[
ImS1,S2 X
]〉
), i.e., the subspace distance between
〈[
TRRE MRRE
]〉
and
〈[
Im{S1,S2} X
]〉
.
3) There exist τ column vectors L1,L2, . . . ,Lτ ∈ FqC and τ row vectors E1,E2, . . . ,Eτ ∈ Fq1×kN such
that e =
∑
i∈[1,τ ] LiEi. In particular, L1,L2, . . . ,Lµ are the columns of Lˆ, and Eµ+1,Eµ+2, . . . ,Eµ+δ
are the rows of Eˆ.
In the following subscript d stands for the last N rows of any matrix/vector. Then we show the following
for our scheme.
Lemma 3. 1) Matrix ed = rd − Mf2 can be expressed as ed =
∑
i∈1,2,...,τ(Li)dEi, where
(L1)d, (L2)d, . . . , (Lµ)d are the columns of Lˆd and Eµ+1,Eµ+2, . . . ,Eµ+δ are the rows of Eˆ.
41) is from Prop. 7, 2) from Thm. 9, and 3) from Prop. 10 in [8].
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2) With probability at least 1− |E|/p, 2τ − µ− δ ≤ 2z
Proof: 1) It is a direct corollary from the third statement of Proposition 2.
2) Using the second statement of Proposition 2 it suffices to prove with probability at least 1 − |E|/p,
dS(
〈[
TRRE MRRE
]〉
,
〈[
ImS1,S2 X
]〉
) ≤ 2z.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, the columns of Ef3 are in the column space of E3 (and
then of E) over Fq. Thus
[
E1 E2 E
f
3
]
and therefore
[
E1G1 E2 E
f
3
]
has rank at most equal to
z over Fq. Using Proposition 1 and (20), dS(〈Ya〉 ,
〈[
T1G1 T2 A
f
]〉
) is no more than 2z. Since
dS(
〈[
TRRE MRRE
]〉
, 〈Ya〉)
= 0, we have dS(
〈[
TRRE MRRE
]〉
,
〈[
T1G1 T2 A
f
]〉
) ≤ 2z.
Using Lemma 2, matrix D =
[
T1G1 T2
]
is invertible with probability at least 1 − |E|/p, so[
ImS1,S2 X
]
has zero subspace distance from
[
D DX
]
=
[
T1G1 T2 A
f
]
. Thus,
dS(
〈[
TRRE MRRE
]〉
,
〈[
ImS1,S2 X
]〉
) ≤ 2z.
In the end combining Lemma 3 and Theorem 3 sink t can take (Lˆd, Eˆ, r) as the input for the Gabidulin
decoding algorithm and decode X2 correctly.
Stage 2: Decoding X1: From (19) sink t gets Y =
[
T1 + E1 T2 + E2 A + E3
]
, computes (T2 +
E2)M2, and then subtracts matrix
[
O (T2 + E2) (T2 + E2)M2
]
from Y . The resulting matrix has N
zero columns in the middle (column n + 1 to column n+N). Disregarding these we get:
Y ′ =
[
T1 T1M1
]
+
[
E1 E3 − E2M2
]
.
The new error matrix E ′ =
[
E1 E3 − E2M2
]
has rank at most z over Fp since the columns of E ′ are
simply linear combinations of columns of E whose rank is at most z. Therefore the problem degenerates
into a single source problem and sink t can decode X1 with probability at least 1 − |E|/p by following
the approach in [8].
Summarizing the above decoding scheme for X1 and X2, we have the following main result:
Theorem 4. Each t can efficiently decode the information from all sources correctly with probability at
least 1− |s||E|/p.
Decoding complexity: For both coherent and non-coherent cases the computational complexity of
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Gabidulin encoding and decoding of two source messages is dominated by the decoding of X2, which
requires O(nNmSℓ log(pnN)) operations over Fp (see [8]).
To generalize our technique to more sources, consider a network with s sources S1,S2, . . . ,Ss. Let Ri
be the rate of Si and ni = Ri +2z for each i ∈ [1, s]. A straightforward generalization uses the multiple-
field-extension technique so that Si uses the generator matrix over finite field of size pn1n2...ni . In the end
the packet length must be at least ng = n1n2 . . . ns, resulting in a decoding complexity O(mSn2g log(png))
increasing exponentially in the number of sources s. Thus the multiple field-extension technique works
in polynomial time only for a fixed number of sources.
Note that the intermediate nodes work in the base field Fp to perform random linear network coding.
The multiple-field-extension is an end-to-end technique, i.e., only the sources and sinks use the extended
field.
C. Coherent case
Sections VI, VII-A and VII-B give code constructions for the non-coherent coding scenario. Note that
a non-coherent coding scheme can also be applied in the coherent setting when the network is known.
Hence, the capacity regions of coherent and non-coherent network coding for the same multi-source
multicast network are the same. However, both the constructions of Sections VII-A and VII-B include
an overhead of incorporating a global coding vector. Therefore, they achieve the outer bounds given by
(4) only asymptotically in packet length. In contrast, in the coherent case, the full capacity region can be
achieved exactly with packets of finite length, as shown in the following:
Proof of Theorem 2, coherent case achievability: We first construct a multi-source multicast network
code C for G that can correct any 2z errors with known locations, called erasures in [25]. We can use
the result of [26] for multi-source multicast network coding in an alternative model where on each link
either an erasure symbol or error-free information is received, by observing the following correspondence
between the two models. We form a graph G ′ by replacing each link l in G with two links in tandem
with a new node vl between them, and adding an additional source node u of rate 2z connected by a new
link kl to each node vl. We use the result from [26] to obtain a multi-source network code that achieves
a given rate vector under any pattern of erasure symbols such that the maxflow-mincut conditions are
satisfied for every subset of sources in G ′. In particular, if erasure symbols (by the definition of [26]) are
received on all but 2z of the new links kl (corresponding to 2z erasures in G by the definition of [25]),
all the original sources can be decoded.
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Let li,j , j = 1, . . . , ni, be the outgoing links of each source si, i = 1, . . . , n. Next, we construct the
graph GS from G by adding a virtual super source node w, and ni links l′i,j, j = 1, . . . , ni, from w to each
source si. Then the code C for the multi-source problem corresponds to a single-source network code CS
on GS where the symbol on each link l′i,j is the same as that on link li,j , and the coding operations at all
other nodes are identical for GS′ and GS .
By [25] the following are equivalent in the single-source case:
1) a linear network code has network minimum distance at least 2z + 1
2) the code corrects any error of weight at most z
3) the code corrects any erasure of weight at most 2z.
This implies that CS has network minimum distance at least 2z+1, and so it can correct any z errors.
VIII. EXTENSION TO MORE THAN TWO SOURCES
When there are more than two sources the extension of our encoding and decoding techniques is
straightforward both for the case of the side-channel and the omniscient model, and up to this point we
have focused on the case of two sources simply for notational convenience. To clarify how our techniques
can extend to multiple sources we will outline the encoding and decoding for an arbitrary number of
sources equal to s and use results from the previous sections.
Side-channel model: For the case of the side-channel model each source encodes its data Xi ∈ FpRi×(ℓ−α),
i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, in a matrix Mi =
[
Li Xi
]
where Li ∈ FpRi×α will be such so that equation Hi = MiPi
holds. Source Si shares with the receiver/receivers the random matrix Hi ∈ FpRi×α along with the random
vector Wi =
[
ri1 ri2 . . . riα
]
. The vector Wi defines matrix Pi ∈ Fpℓ×α since its (m,n) − th entry
equals (rin)m. Every receiver follows the decoding steps described in Section VI and gets equations
MiPi = M
s
i (FHi) = Hi, i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, that can be solved with high probability using Gaussian
elimination.
Omniscient model: For the case of the omniscient adversary we will need to extend the field we work with
s times. Assume that ni = Ri + 2z and the information from source Si is organized into a matrix Xi ∈
Fp
Ri×kn1...ns
. Before transmission matrix Xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1}, is viewed as matrix Xi ∈ FpiRi×kni+1...ns
in the larger field Fpi where pi = pn1...ni and Xs is viewed as a matrix Xs ∈ FpsRs×k where ps = pn1...ns .
Each matrix Xi is multiplied with a generator matrix Gi ∈ Fpini×Ri , creating GiXi whose unfolded version
M ′i = (GiXi)
u is a matrix in Fpni×kn1...ns . All matrices Gi are chosen as generator matrices for Gabidulin
codes and have the capability of correcting errors of rank at most z over field Fpi .
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Source S1 create the message matrix M1 by appending some header to M ′1, specifically the message
is M1 =
[
In1 On1×n2 . . . On1×ns M
′
1
]
where In1 is the identity matrix with dimensions n1 × n1 and
Oni×nj is the zero matrix with dimensions ni×nj . Similarly M2 =
[
On2×n1 In2 . . . On2×ns M
′
2
]
, . . . ,
Ms =
[
Ons×n1 Ons×n2 . . . Ins M
′
s
]
and therefore the packet length is ℓ =
∑s
i=1 ni + k
∏s
i=1 ni over
Fp the base field of network coding.
Similar to equation (19) the received matrix can be written as
Y = T1M1 + . . .+ TsMs + TzZ
⇔Y =
[
Y1 . . . Ys Ys+1
]
=
[
T1 . . . Ts A
′
]
+ E
where A′ = T1M ′1 + . . .+TsM ′s and E ∈ FpmS×ℓ has rank no more than z over field Fp. For the decoding
of information from source Ss we form the matrix Y ′α =
[
Y1G1 . . . Ys−1Gs−1 Ys Y
f
s+1
]
and transform
it to a row-reduced echelon form as in Proposition 2. Since matrix D′ =
[
T1G1 . . . Ts−1Gs−1 Ts
]
is
invertible with high probability similar to Lemma 2 one can use Lemma 3 and decode Xs. By subtracting[
OmS×n1 . . . OmS×ns−1 Ys YsM
′
s
]
from Y the problem reduces to s− 1 number of sources and one
can solve it recursively.
IX. COMPARISON OF OUR CODE CONSTRUCTIONS
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE METRICS OF THE CODE CONSTRUCTIONS GIVEN IN SECTIONS VI, VII-A AND VII-B FOR ANY
ACHIEVABLE RATE VECTOR (R1, R2, . . . , Rs)
decoding complexity packet length
Side-channel model O(ℓm3S) Θ(m2S)
Omniscient adversary: O(plmS) Θ(mS)
subspace codes
Omniscient adversary: O(m2s+1S log(pmsS)) Θ(
∏s
i=1mSi)
field extension codes
In this section we compare some performance metrics of the code constructions given in Sec-
tions VI, VII-A and VII-B. For convenience, Table II summarizes the requirements on the decoding
complexity and the packet length for each of the achievable schemes. For clarity of comparison, we
approximate all quantities presented in Table II; the exact expressions are derived in the corresponding
sections.
Based on Table II, we can make the following observations about the practicality of our constructions:
27
• If the secret channel is available, one should use the side-channel model construction since it not
only achieves higher rates but also provides lower decoding complexity.
• Multiple-field extension codes have computational complexity that is polynomial in all network
parameters, but exponential in the number of sources. Therefore, they are preferable when the number
of sources is small.
• Random subspace codes become beneficial compared to multiple-field extension codes as the number
of sources grows.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work we consider the problem of communicating messages from multiple sources to multiple
sinks over a network that contains a hidden malicious adversary who observes and attempts to jam
communication. We consider two models. In the first model, the sources share a small secret (that is
unknown to the adversary) with the sink(s). In the second model, this resource is unavailable – no
limitations on the adversary’s knowledge are assumed. We prove upper bounds on the set of achievable
rates in these settings. Since more resources are available to the honest parties in the first model, the rate-
region corresponding to the upper bounds in the first model is larger than that in the second model. We
also provide novel algorithms that achieve any point in the rate-regions corresponding to the two models.
Our codes for the first model have computational complexity that is polynomial in network parameters. For
the second model we have two algorithms. In our codes based on random subspace design, all sources
code over the same field, and decoding is based on minimum injection distance. Our codes based on
multiple-field extension have computational complexity that is polynomial in all network parameters, but
exponential in the number of sources.
Our codes are end-to-end and decentralized – each interior node is oblivious to the presence of an
adversary, and merely performs random linear network coding. They also do not require prior knowledge
of the network topology or coding operations by any honest party. They work in the presence of a
computationally unbounded adversary, even one who knows the network topology and coding operations
and can decide where and how to jam the network on the basis of this information.
A problem that remains open is that of computationally efficient codes for the omniscient adversarial
case with a large number of sources. This may require new insights in algebraic code design.
Besides multi-source multicast, our codes have implications for the much more common scenario of
multiple unicasts. One class of codes (that is not rate-optimal) for this problem assumes that each sink
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treats information that it is uninterested in as noise, and decodes and successively cancels such messages
out. Since the code constructions provided here achieve higher rates than those available in prior work,
they may aid in non-trivial achievability schemes (though in general still not rate-optimal) for this problem.
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